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Abstract 
 
Recently, microfinance has come under increasing criticism raising questions of the 
validity of iconic studies which have justified the microfinance phenomenon. This 
paper applies propensity score matching (PSM), which has become widely used for 
the analysis of observational data, to the study by Pitt and Khandker (1998) which 
has been labelled the most rigorous evidence supporting claims that microfinance 
benefits the poorest especially when targeted on women. After carefully 
reconstructing the data we differentiate outcomes by gender of borrower, take 
account of borrowing from several formal and informal sources, and find that the 
mainly positive impacts of microfinance that we observe are shown by sensitivity 
analysis to be highly vulnerable to selection on unobservables, and we are therefore 
not convinced that the relationships between microfinance and outcomes are causal. 
 
Introduction 
 
The concept of microcredit was first introduced in Bangladesh by Nobel Peace Prize 
winner Muhammad Yunus. Professor Yunus started Grameen Bank more than 30 
years ago aiming to reduce poverty by providing small loans to the countries’ rural 
poor (Yunus, 1999). It is argued that microfinance can not only enable the poor to 
access credit, providing them access to remunerative activities and relieving them of 
onerous debts (Khandker, 1998; 2000). A key feature of the Grameen Bank and many 
other microfinance organisations has been the targeting of women on the grounds 
that, compared to men, they perform better as microfinance institution (MFIs) clients 
and that their participation has more desirable development outcomes, an argument 
that is most authoritatively supported by Pitt and Khandker (1998 – henceforth PnK). 
However, despite the apparent success and popularity of microfinance, it is widely 
argued that there is little convincing evidence yet that microfinance programmes 
have positive impacts (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005; 2010); for reviews 
of microfinance impact evaluations reiterating this point see also Sebstad and Chen, 
1996; Gaile and Foster, 1996; Goldberg, 2005; Odell, 2010).  
 
A number of putatively rigorous studies suggest social and economic benefits from 
microfinance (Hulme and Mosley, 1996; PnK; Khandker, 1998, 2005; Coleman, 1999; 
Rutherford, 2001; Morduch and Haley, 2002). However, Dichter and Harper (2007), 
Roodman and Morduch (2009 – henceforth RnM) and Bateman and Chang (2009) 
argue that microfinance is neither always beneficial nor rigorously demonstrated. 
The debate over microfinance impact intensified recently with the publication of the 
first two randomised control trials (RCTs) in the sector (Banerjee et al, 2009; Karlan 
and Zinman, 2009) which both raise doubts about the causal link between 
microfinance participation and poverty alleviation.  
 
Many of the early microfinance impact evaluations fail to address the problem of 
selection bias (Sebstad and Chen, 1996; Gaile and Foster, 1996); selection bias occurs 
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because participants self-select or are selected into a programme (in a non-random 
way), and therefore differ from those who are not selected; this undermines simple 
impact estimates based on non-random control groups (Heckman, 1979). A few 
studies of microfinance have addressed this problem more thoroughly (for example 
Hulme and Mosley, 1996; PnK); these studies, however, have not been uncontested1
 
.  
This paper re-examines the evidence of what is commonly seen as the most 
authoritative microfinance impact evaluation (RnM) which was conducted by PnK 
on three microfinance programmes in Bangladesh. The challenges of microfinance 
impact evaluations which PnK (Morduch, 1998; RnM) address is to account for 
participant selection and program placement2 biases (PnK; Coleman, 1999); PnK do 
this using a specific model (see below), and Khandker (2005 – henceforth Khandker) 
adds data on the same households to construct a panel, putatively overcoming at 
least the problems for evaluation posed by participant selection. A number of studies 
have attempted to replicate the findings of the original PnK study, and of Khandker. 
For example, Morduch (1998 – henceforth Morduch) contested PnK but was 
seemingly refuted by Pitt (1999 – henceforth Pitt)3
 
. RnM with considerable effort and 
difficulty replicated PnK and Khandker, producing variables which in some cases 
differ significantly from their equivalent in PnK and Khandker, and, using different 
estimating software, find no convincing evidence for either impact claimed by PnK 
and Khandker.  
Chemin (2008 – henceforth Chemin), applies propensity score matching (PSM) to his 
construction of the PnK data; PSM has become a very popular technique in the area 
of development economics in recent years; it has roots in the literature on 
experiments beginning with Neyman (1923). Rubin (1973a, b; 1974; 1977; 1978) 
expands on this literature and laid the conceptual foundations of matching. The 
technique has been further refined in particular by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983; 
1984). PSM is performed by matching participants to non-participants drawn from a 
suitable population using a predicted probability of programme participation or the 
‘propensity score’ (Ravallion, 2001; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005; 2008). The 
treatment effect is then estimated by comparing the mean outcomes of the 
participants and their matches (Ravallion, 2001). This method can account for 
selection bias due to observable characteristics used in the matching process. Its 
drawback, however, is that bias due to selection on unobservables remains (Smith 
and Todd, 2005). Selection on unobservables, or ‘hidden bias’ as Rosenbaum (2002) 
calls it, are driven by unobserved variables that influence treatment allocation as well 
                                                     
1 Hulme and Mosley (1996) were contested by Morduch (1999) and PnK by Morduch (1998) and RnM. 
2 The locations of programmes are also chosen in a non-random way and therefore differ from other 
places that could be used as controls.  
3 The complexity of the PnK and Pitt method, using unique and unrecoverable computer code (see 
footnote 21 for correspondence between Roodman and Pitt), seemingly meant this debate remained 
unresolved in the grey literature until RnM replicated PnK. 
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as potential outcomes (Becker and Caliendo, 2007). Sensitivity analysis of PSM 
results can identify the vulnerability of the estimated impact to unobservables 
(Rosenbaum, 2002).   
 
With his construction of the relevant variables from the unit level PnK data, Chemin 
finds statistically significant but smaller effects than those of PnK on all outcome 
variables except male labour supply (Chemin: 478). However, he does not 
distinguish outcomes by the gender of borrowers and does not apply sensitivity 
analysis, which is good practice in PSM studies (Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini, 2006; 
Nannicini, 2007). In this paper we apply PSM to our construction of the relevant 
variables, examine the effects of the gender of the borrower, and subject the results to 
sensitivity analysis; first we reconstruct the data. We find differences from variables 
reported in Chemin (but only minor differences from RnM4), and draw attention to 
borrowing from sources other than microfinance by sample households. Borrowing 
from MFIs may substitute (Khandker, 2000), or complement (Fernando, 1997; 
Coleman, 1999) borrowing from other sources.  Borrowing from more than one 
source may occur either because the borrower requires more finance than a single 
MFI will supply5
 
, or because further finance is needed to make repayments 
(Fernando, 1997; Coleman, 1999; Venkata and Yamini, 2010). We apply sensitivity 
analysis to assess the robustness of our results and reflect on the usefulness of PSM 
in the context of these data. 
The paper proceeds as follows: we briefly discuss the challenges of replication and 
(re-) construction of appropriate variables with the PnK data, and briefly introduce 
PSM and sensitivity analysis. We then outline the particularities in PnK’s research 
design, apply PSM to (our reconstruction of) the PnK data, investigate effects of the 
gender of the borrower and the role of borrowing from other sources (by 
microfinance members and others) on microfinance impact; we apply sensitivity 
analysis to the matching results to draw conclusions as to the robustness and 
limitations of PSM in this context and what seems reasonable to conclude with 
regard to the impacts of microfinance by applying PSM to these data. 
 
While our PSM results suggest that microfinance participation has some significant 
impacts (negative as well as positive), they are in general not distinguishable from 
those of other sources of finance. Moreover, sensitivity analysis shows that all 
impacts are very sensitive to unobservables, which are therefore quite likely to have 
confounded the results. We conclude that, properly applied with sensitivity analysis, 
PSM resolves the particular problems in the PnK study by showing that it cannot 
                                                     
4 Because our constructed variables are so similar to those of RnM we do not exhaustively compare 
our variables to either RnM or PnK; we note differences with RnM in the relevant places. 
5 Including cases where microfinance borrowers may not be able to borrow sufficient to repay all 
previous outstanding loans from other sources (Coleman, 1999).  
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generate robust conclusions of impact with these outcome variables6
 
. However, PSM 
may not be an appropriate tool because the data set does not contain a suitable, large 
and relatively homogeneous control group. Hence, by extension, PSM may not be the 
miracle tool implied by the recent epidemic of applications, as we discuss below.   
Replication challenges 
 
The objective of replication is to allow other researchers to assess the robustness of 
the findings (Hamermesh, 2007), and is a characteristic of natural if not social science. 
To allow replication, good documentation of the study design and data are required, 
and there should be access to the data, and details of their variable construction and 
analysis7
 
.  
In the case of PnK, most of the data, including questionnaires and variable codes are 
(at the time of writing this paper) available on the World Bank website8 but 
replication remains a challenge. Firstly, the survey forms and variable descriptions 
are problematic; secondly certain data necessary for replication were (and others are) 
missing9. Some of these data10 were obtained after contacting the authors (either by 
Roodman, or ourselves). The replication exercise reported here was greatly facilitated 
by RnM who have made all their data and codes available11
 
. 
We have compared our data with RnM’s data, variable by variable; remaining minor 
discrepancies reflect differences in our interpretation of some variables. Nonetheless, 
re-running RnM’s Stata do-files using our data set very closely approximates their 
substantive results. RnM replicated the key PnK studies12
                                                     
6 Other outcome variables have been addressed in other papers using the PnK dataset (Pitt et al, 1999; 
Pitt, 2000; McKernan, 2002; Pitt and Khandker, 2002; Pitt et al, 2003; Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright, 
2006). 
, using similar estimation 
7 The American Economic Review (AER), for example, requires its authors to make their data sets and 
code available which are then uploaded onto a website maintained by the AER especially for this 
purpose. Authors have been compliant with this policy so far but can opt out in case their data are 
proprietary and/or confidential (Hamermesh, 2007: 717). 
8http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:21470820
~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html. All data used for this paper come from 
this source. 
9 It is not possible to be sure that the data posted are indeed exactly the same as those analysed by 
PnK, but the main problems probably lie not in variations in the raw data but in subsequent 
manipulations, variable constructions, and analytical procedures. 
10 Such as data on consumer price indices, sampling weights and landholding details. 
11 http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1422302. The data and variable construction are 
mainly in SQL, although statistical analysis is in Stata; our data manipulation and analysis is all in 
Stata.  
12 RnM do not replicate Chemin or a few other studies that used the PnK data (Khandker, 1996, 2000; 
Pitt et al, 1999; Pitt, 2000; McKernan, 2002; Pitt and Khandker, 2002; Pitt et al, 2003; Menon, 2006; Pitt, 
Khandker and Cartwright, 2006). 
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strategies but different software13
 
. They find that ‘decisive statistical evidence in 
favor of [the idea that microcredit alleviates poverty, smoothes household expenditure and 
lessens the pinch of hunger especially when women are involved in borrowing] is absent 
from these studies’ (RnM: 40). We apply PSM which, as used by Chemin, currently 
provides the only remaining credible evaluation of microfinance using these data. 
The Impact of Microfinance in Bangladesh 
 
PnK use data from a World Bank funded study which conducted a survey in three 
waves in 1991-199214
 
 on three leading microfinance group-lending programmes in 
Bangladesh, namely Grameen Bank (GB), the Bangladesh Rural Advancement 
Committee (BRAC) and the Bangladesh Rural Development Board (BRDB) (PnK: 
959). A quasi-experimental design was used which sampled target (having a choice 
to participate/being eligible) and non-target households (having no choice to 
participate/not being eligible) from villages with microfinance programme (treatment 
villages) and non-programme villages (control villages).  
The survey was conducted in 87 villages from 29 thanas15;  the treatment villages 
were randomly selected from a list of villages provided by the MFIs’ local offices and 
the control villages were randomly selected from the governments’ village census; 
1,798 households were selected out of which 1,538 were target  households and 260 
were non-target households (PnK: 974). According to PnK (974), out of those 1,538 
households, 905 effectively participated in microfinance (59%). The three survey 
waves (henceforth R1-3) were timed to account for seasonal variations, (Pitt, 2000:28-
29). The study focuses on measuring the impact of microfinance participation by 
gender on indicators such as labour supply, school enrolment, expenditure per capita 
and non-land asset ownership. PnK find that microcredit has significant positive 
impacts on many of these indicators and find larger positive impacts when women 
are involved in borrowing. For example, ‘annual household consumption 
expenditure, […], increased 18 taka for every 100 additional taka borrowed by 
women from these credit programs [GB, BRAC, BRDB], compared with 11 taka for 
men’ (PnK: 988)16
                                                     
13 Our replication of PnK confirms RnM notwithstanding minor differences in variable construction 
(our differences with RnM arise, mainly, from different interpretation of variables, for example we 
included savings-in-kind when calculating non-landed asset variables and worked with slightly 
different assumptions when calculating landed asset variables. More details are available from the 
authors). 
. 
14 In areas not affected by the cyclone of April 1991. 
15 A thana (literally police station, also known as upazila) is a unit of administration in Bangladesh; in 
1985 there were 495 upazilas (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 1985) and 507 upazilas in 2001 
(Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2004). 
16 A follow-up data set (henceforth R4) was collected in 1998-1999 re-surveying the same households 
that were already interviewed in R1-3 and some new households increasing the overall sample size to 
2,599 households (Khandker: 271). Khandker uses standard panel analysis to conclude that 
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PnK adopt an estimation strategy for assessing the impact of microfinance 
participation involving comparisons of ‘treated’ and ‘non-treated’ households in 
‘treated’ villages and ‘non-treated’ households in ‘non-treated’ (control) villages. 
Treatment refers to participating in the loan programme one of the selected MFIs; at 
the household level this varies according to the gender of the borrower, and at the 
village level to the presence of the MFI in the village. However, comparing 
households in treatment and control villages is not sufficient for obtaining impact 
estimates for microfinance programme participation because the villages differ (there 
is programme placement bias17
 
) and households commonly self-select into 
microfinance. In this type of group-based lending individuals select themselves, can 
be selected (or excluded) by their peers and/or by microfinance loan officers, giving 
rise to selection bias.  
In principle all the MFIs operate an eligibility criterion that participating households 
should be cultivating18 less than 0.5 acres of land at the time of recruitment into the 
MFI programme, so that only households meeting this criterion are eligible. In fact, 
the eligibility criterion is not strictly met by quite a few microfinance borrowers as 
pointed out by Morduch, so that there is a gap between participation and eligibility19
 
. 
PnK use the (de facto) participation criterion as their identification strategy, 
assuming that it is exogenous. They sample treatment and control villages containing 
non-target/landed and target/landless households. PnK’s (ideal) identification 
strategy can be understood graphically by looking at Figure 1.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
microcredit has positive impacts on the poorest and reduces poverty among programme participants, 
especially when women are involved in borrowing, and thus confirms PnK’s headline results. 
However, RnM’s replication of Khandker casts doubts about Khandker’s approach and findings 
(RnM: 39). Using our, slightly different data we concur with RnM that panel estimation does not show 
clear evidence of microfinance impact. We do not further discuss this approach here. 
17 The assumption was that MFIs choose more remote and backward villages (PnK; Coleman, 1999). 
Hence, microfinance impact may vary according to village type. 
18 There is some confusion about whether the eligibility criterion is cultivated (operated) or owned 
land, and whether this includes homestead land. 
19 Thus there are de jure (cultivating less than 0.5 acres), and de facto (participating) eligibility 
categories; this is discussed further below. 
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Source: Authors illustration based on Morduch and Chemin.  
Notes: This diagram ignores that the eligibility criterion was not strictly (literally) 
enforced. Thus the actual strategy used (de facto) participation. 
 
            
        
 
            
        
 
 
 
PnK suggest comparing the discontinuity between participant (eligible) and non-
participant (not eligible households in treatment and control villages; that is, the 
discontinuity or cut-off point at the boundary between group B and A in control 
villages, and between group D to C in treatment villages (Figure 1). The difference 
between these two sets of comparisons is estimated by applying village-level fixed-
effects to account for unobserved differences between treatment and control villages.  
 
The application of an eligibility criterion as an identification strategy is plausible 
provided it is strictly enforced. However, as Morduch points out, mistargeting 
occurred (see also Ravallion, 2008: 3818; Chemin: 465). Group D contains participants 
who own more than 0.5 acres of land. Pitt rationalises this by claiming that the value 
of land of treated households which cultivate/possess more than 0.5 acres is so low 
that the value of the land of these households is effectively less than the median 
value of 0.5 acres of average land; however, in control villages (groups A and B) 
households were categorised as eligible based on the less than 0.5 acres of cultivated 
land alone20
 
.  
                                                     
20 This issue is addressed in appendix 5.  
A 
Landed Households 
Not eligible 
> 0.5 acres 
 
 
Treatment villages 
C 
Landed Households 
Not eligible 
> 0.5 acres 
 
D 
Landless Households 
 Eligible 
< 0.5 acres 
 
B 
Landless Households 
Eligible 
< 0.5 acres 
 
Split 
E 
 Eligible 
Participants 
< 0.5 acres 
F 
 Eligible 
Non - 
participants 
< 0.5 acres 
Non-
participating/ 
not eligible 
households 
Participating/
eligible 
households 
Control villages 
Figure 1: Intended identification strategy 
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None of the authors who re-visited the original PnK study could replicate and 
confirm the original findings of PnK (Morduch; Chemin; RnM)21
 
.  
PSM, PnK and the role of multiple sources of borrowing 
 
Most microfinance impact evaluations are designed on the assumption that other 
formal and informal credit organisations are absent and would not have entered the 
financial markets in the absence of MFIs. However, as illustrated by Figure 2 (and 
Appendix 3), this is not what the data show. Households in the PnK data obtain 
loans not only from MFIs but also from other formal and informal sources, for 
example from formal sources such as government controlled banks like the Krishi 
Bank or from informal sources such as relatives, friends, landlords, traders, 
moneylenders, and so on. Khandker (2000) investigates the impact of microfinance 
on informal borrowing using a two-step approach. He finds that microcredit 
borrowing appears to reduce borrowing from informal sources, but does not explore 
the impact of other sources of borrowing on the outcomes explored in PnK. 
 
While much of the literature seems to assume otherwise, there is evidence that the 
poor choose to borrow from multiple sources for various reasons, including for 
purposes not sanctioned by MFIs (Fernando, 1997; Coleman, 1999), and do not just 
access microfinance to access credit or reduce the burden of traditional sources of 
credit (as argued by Khandker, 2000). For example, poor borrowers use (fungible) 
credit for consumption; to augment microfinance loans which are rationed in order 
to invest in more remunerative activities which require larger amounts of credit; to 
make the regular payments required by MFIs when the income from the activities in 
which they have invested does not yield the regular returns required to meet the 
repayment schedule, to improve their portfolios, and, no doubt, other reasons. Those 
with different portfolios will have different observable and unobservable 
characteristics. Thus, a comparison of (eligible) participants with (eligible) non-
participants will include among the participants those who also borrow from other 
sources, and similarly among the control group(s); these groups will be quite 
heterogeneous, as will any impacts of microfinance borrowing. While it might be 
desirable to compare more homogenous sub-groups separately so one could 
distinguish differences in impacts and probably obtain more precise and statistically 
significant results, this is constrained by sample sizes in existing data sets.  
 
                                                     
21 Apparently the data sets and code used for PnK were archived on CD-ROMs which are no longer 
readable (correspondence from Pitt to Roodman on February 28, 2008). Others who have used these 
data using similar procedures to PnK cannot supply their data or code (see personal communication 
with McKernan on April 16, 2009). Hence, it remains moot as to whether the differences between PnK 
and RnM are due to (1) differences in the raw data used; (2) differences in variable construction; or, (3) 
differences in the statistical estimations. (1) and (2) cannot be assessed, but those with the appropriate 
skills can assess RnM. 
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Figure 2 reports the distribution of individuals by reported borrowing 
characteristics22. Of 922 de facto (including de jure) microfinance participants23 47 
had sources of borrowing other than microcredit. Among the eligible non-
participating individuals in treatment villages, 216 had borrowing from other formal 
or informal sources, but 5,070 (87%) did not report borrowing. 397 (17%) not eligible 
individuals in treatment villages (out of 2,309 not eligible individuals) participated in 
microfinance – a significant proportion. In all the treatment villages 299 individuals 
had borrowings from other sources. In the control villages, there were a lower 
proportion of eligible individuals, but the borrowing from non-microfinance sources 
in R1-3 was much greater than among treatment villages (8% versus 3.5%, or 6.8 
versus 4.1% among the de jure eligible)24. This suggests that microfinance may have 
partly crowded out other formal or informal sources of borrowing. Thus the 
empirical strategy envisaged by PnK may be misleading since a comparison between 
treatment and control group members is most probably confounded. T
 
herefore, an 
alternative strategy using comparisons between different categories of borrowers and 
with non-borrowers may be more appropriate to identify heterogeneous impact 
estimates.  
                                                     
22 Borrowing is reported in the data by individual. We assume for the purposes of this exposition that 
the reported borrower is acting autonomously and is not a proxy for another household member, as it 
is sometimes suggested (see Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1996). 
23 502 + 23 + 373 + 24 = 922 borrowers (microfinance as well as non-microfinance sources); 23 + 24 = 47 
microfinance participant which also use other non-microfinance sources. The sample of 47 is too small 
and cannot be used to identify further more homogeneous sub-groups within this sub-group. 
24 Appendix 3 provides a more detailed breakdown of individuals by borrower characteristics and by 
treatment and control villages across eligibility criteria to further illustrate that while it might be 
desirable to compare more homogenous sub-groups separately; this is likely to be constrained by 
small sample sizes. 
Duvendack, M. & Palmer-Jones, R.                         DEV Working Paper 27 
 
14 
 
 
While t-tests between different treatment and control groups, or simple analysis of 
variance can be applied with treatment and borrowing categories as factors, PSM 
matches participants and non-participants from within different groups on the basis 
of observable characteristics, reducing heterogeneity in the control group (Caliendo 
and Kopeinig, 2008). Firstly, as already noted, a significant proportion of 
microfinance borrowers are not formally eligible. Secondly, there is the question of 
whether microfinance participants who borrow from other sources should be 
Treatment 
villages 
(8120) 
Eligible 
(5811) 
Not eligible 
(2309) 
De jure 
(5811) 
De facto 
(397) 
MF (502) 
Multiple (23) 
None (5070) 
Borr (216) 
Non-
participant 
(1912) 
MF (373) 
Multiple (24) 
None (1876) 
Borr (36) 
Control 
villages 
(1559) 
Eligible 
(789) 
Not eligible 
(770) 
None (735) 
Borr (54) 
None (709) 
Borr (61) 
De jure 
(789) 
Acronyms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eligibility 
Borrowing – by individual 
Figure 2: Availability of treatment options in PnK study 
Village 
Source: Authors illustration using PnK data, see footnote 8.  
Notes:  
1. MF=Participant in microfinance only; Multiple=Participant in microfinance and other 
non-microfinance (formal/informal) borrowing; Borr=Participant in other non-
microfinance (formal/informal) borrowing; None=No borrowing at all 
2. The number of individuals is given in brackets.  
3. Eligibility is < 0.5 acres of land. 
4. Explanation of acronyms: 
   
Where: 
Y = treatment status 
a = village type (TR=treatment village, CTL=control village); b = eligibility (ej=eligible de 
jure, nef=not eligible de facto, nenp=not eligible non-participant, ne=not eligible); c = 
treatment option (MF=MF, Multiple=Multiple, Borr=Borr, None=None) 
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considered similar to those who borrow from MFIs alone; for example, being unable 
to meet regular microfinance repayments, causing them to borrow from other 
sources, or having greater demand for credit because of observed (or unobserved) 
characteristics25
 
. Borrowing from other sources cannot be included in the logit model 
(discussed below) because of potential endogeneity. It is possible that they have 
different characteristics. 
The comparisons we propose are empirically derived and are guided by the number 
of observations available in each respective group. All comparisons are for 
individuals and include the spouses of microcredit participants as potential matches 
(noting that sex is a variable in the logit model which is discussed below). Thus, 
using the acronyms introduced in Figure 2 we compare persons who borrow only 
from an MFI to borrowers from MFI and other sources 
( ), since these groups may differ in 
observables and unobservables accounting for their different borrowing 
characteristics. However, this comparison will not yield useful results since the 
sample size of the latter group ( ) contains few individuals for 
matching (see Appendix 3 for a further breakdown of this group by formal and 
informal sources of borrowing as well as by village type). Thirdly, since not eligible 
non-participants are observably different to eligible participants they are not a 
suitable control group (except perhaps for the non-eligible MFI borrowers). Fourthly, 
there is the question of whether the population of control villages can be considered 
appropriate counterfactuals at all since the village economies differ in ways which 
mean that the eligible participants (owning less than 0.5 acres of land) are 
significantly different from eligible non-participants in the control villages in 
observables, unobservables and due to living in a context which is different in 
complex ways from treatment villages.  
 
Nevertheless, the eligible individuals in the control villages may be the most suitable 
control group (with or without those who borrow from non-microfinance sources), 
that is . The next most appropriate control group may be the 
eligible non-participants in treatment villages (with or without those who borrow 
from non-microfinance sources - ), even though these people, 
presumably having the opportunity to borrow from MFIs, either self-selected out or 
were excluded possibly as the result of unobservables.  
                                                     
25 Discussing the theoretical aspects of rural financial markets would extend an already long paper 
beyond its main purposes described above. 
Duvendack, M. & Palmer-Jones, R.                         DEV Working Paper 27 
 
16 
 
The specific comparisons are: 
 
1. All MFI borrowers versus eligible non-borrowers26
 
: 
  
This comparison looks at all (de facto27
 
) microfinance participants versus all other 
eligible individuals in both treatment and control villages that do not report any 
other borrowing. Since all individuals in this comparison fulfil the eligibility 
criterion, we assume a certain degree of homogeneity of members of these groups 
which makes them suitable for comparison. 
2. All MFI borrowers versus all non-borrowers: 
 
   
This comparison is analogous to comparison 1; it compares de jure and de facto 
microfinance participants versus all other individuals but irrespective of eligibility 
across treatment and control villages that do not have any other borrowing at all. 
 
3. All borrowers (any source) versus all non-borrowers: 
 
In this comparison all individuals that participate in either microfinance or other 
non-microfinance borrowing across treatment and control villages and across 
eligibility criteria are pooled. 
 
4. All MFI borrowers versus borrowers from other non-microfinance (formal and 
informal) sources: 
 
  +  +  
This last comparison 4 examines de jure and de facto microfinance participants 
versus individuals that have other non-microfinance borrowing across treatment and 
control villages irrespective of eligibility. Descriptive statistics for individuals 
belonging to the respective treatment groups are in Appendix 2.  
                                                     
26 We also compared eligible microfinance borrowers versus eligible non-borrowers and versus all 
non-borrowers, the results did not yield any meaningful differences to the results obtained from 
comparison 1 and 2. 
27  Using de jure microfinance borrowers does not alter the results. 
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As mentioned earlier, PnK find microcredit is more effective when women are 
involved. We also provide separate impact estimates for women and men 
separately28
 
.  
Determinants of microfinance participation 
 
Having identified relevant groups to compare, we now describe the matching 
process. We derive a model of observable variables that predicts their likelihood of 
microfinance participation (their propensity score), match treatment and controls 
using the propensity score, and then compute the treatment effects for the various 
comparison groups. Given the variables that the PnK data provide, the following 
propensity score model draws on Coleman (1999), Alexander (2001), Armendáriz de 
Aghion and Morduch (2005), Coleman (2006) and Chemin29
 
:  
(1)                + δ  
Where: 
 = participating household 
 = vector of individual-specific variables 
 = vector of household-specific variables 
  = village-level fixed-effects 
The dependent variable (  in the model presented in equation (1) represents 
eligible participants (i) in village (j); a value of 1 is assumed when an individual 
participates and a value of 0 if not.  is a vector of individual-specific variables such 
as age and marital status, and  is a vector of household-specific variables 
representing variables such as education and wealth.   is a vector of village level 
variables. All estimations use village-level fixed-effects. 
                                                     
28 We would ideally split other non-microcredit sources of borrowing ( into formal and informal 
sources but with the PnK data the comparison groups become too small to provide any meaningful 
results (see Appendix 3 for more details). 
29 We do not dwell in detail on the problems of replicating Chemin here or differences in our results. 
Suffice to say that the code available to us did not allow us to exactly replicate the descriptive statistics 
or the logit coefficients reported by Chemin. As mentioned earlier, our data set approximates that of 
RnM. 
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Table 1: Logistic regression model for all four treatment groups across treatment and 
control villages and across eligibility criteria 
Independent variables     
Sex HH head (male=1) 0.836*** 0.792*** -0.472 0.656*** 
 
0.000 0.000 -0.333 -0.001 
Age (years) 0.007** 0.008*** 0.044*** 0.021*** 
 
-0.025 -0.008 0.000 0.000 
Age household head -0.007* -0.010** -0.024*** -0.015*** 
(years) -0.081 -0.014 0.000 0.000 
Number adult male in -0.270*** -0.260*** -0.175** -0.221*** 
household 0.000 0.000 -0.039 0.000 
Marital status (yes=1) 1.173*** 1.179*** 2.029*** 1.472*** 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Highest education of any 0.007 0.010 0.070*** 0.035*** 
household member -0.615 -0.470 -0.001 -0.005 
Highest education any 
 
-0.069*** -0.074*** 0.022 -0.043*** 
female household 
 
0.000 0.000 -0.352 -0.007 
Livestock value -0.000** -0.000* 0.000 0.000 
 
-0.031 -0.063 -0.417 -0.210 
Own non-farm enterprise 0.322*** 0.324*** 0.050 0.263*** 
(yes=1) 0.000 0.000 -0.666 0.000 
Household size -0.041* -0.046** 0.005 -0.032*   
 
-0.081 -0.042 -0.875 -0.099 
Village dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 5436 5436 5436 5436 
Pseudo R-squared 0.125 0.129 0.135 0.103 
Source: Authors calculations. For differences with Chemin, see footnote 29. 
Notes:  p-values in italics. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Using PnK 
data, see footnote 8. Control variables such as savings, landholdings of household head’s parents and 
landholdings of household head’s brothers were included, all insignificant. Descriptive statistics for 
all four treatment groups can be found in Appendix 2. 
 
Table 1 shows that the main variables that are statistically significant across all four 
treatment groups are age, age of household head, number of adult males in the 
household and marital status. Highest education of any female household member, 
ownership of a non-farm enterprise, sex of household head and household size are 
statistically significant across . However, the sign of the 
coefficients and the level of significance vary from group to group. Further, note that 
the pseudo R-squared for the various models is rather low ranging from 0.103 to 
0.135 (and lower than reported by Chemin).  
Duvendack, M. & Palmer-Jones, R.                         DEV Working Paper 27 
 
19 
 
Treatment group results 
 
As mentioned above, the basic idea of matching is to compare a participant with one 
or more non-participants who are similar in terms of a set of observed covariates X 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005; 2008). This requires predicting propensity scores for 
each individual, that is participants as well as non-participants using a logit or a 
probit model. We used the logit model presented in Table 1. Before implementing the 
actual matching process, we examine whether the common support assumption is 
satisfied. 
 
Where the densities of the estimated propensity scores for participants and non-
participants overlap reasonably well, the common support assumption is met (Abou-
Ali et al, 2009). Figure 3 presents the density of propensity scores, indicating 
somewhat different densities for participants (YMF) and non-participants (YNone) 
(pooling treatment and control villages). This implies that many households would 
not be good matches as the density of propensity scores of potential controls occurs 
at low propensity scores while than of treatment households are at high propensity 
scores30
                                                     
30 This is further explored in Appendix 4. 
. Graphs (not shown) for other comparisons are similar even when using only 
de jure eligible persons.  
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Figure 2: Distribution of propensity scores for participants (YMF) and non-participants 
(YNone
 
) (comparison 2), all villages  
Source: Authors calculations. 
 
Table 2 and Table 3 present the differences in the outcome variables for participants 
and their matched non-participants for all four comparisons described earlier. Table 
2 illustrates the impact estimates for microcredit participation for all participants 
(male and female together) while Table 3 provides impact estimates for male and 
female participants separately. Two different matching algorithms were applied, 
nearest neighbour matching with replacement31, and kernel matching using three 
different bandwidths (0.01, 0.02 and 0.05), to assess the degree of variability of the 
different matching results across algorithms32
 
. 
The distributions of the covariates for the treatment and controls need to be similar, 
that is balanced (Abou-Ali et al, 2009). Our comparisons all pass balancing tests33
                                                     
31 This allows a control household to match to more than one treatment household. 
, 
32 The literature on the choice of matching algorithms is not yet very developed. Morgan and Winship 
(2007: 109) argue that kernel matching, introduced by Heckman et al (1998) and Heckman, Ichimura 
and Todd (1998) appears to be the most efficient and preferred algorithm. Nearest neighbour 
matching was chosen for its popularity, which is probably due to it being easy to understand and easy 
to implement. We present only the kernel matching estimates with a bandwidth of 0.05. All other 
results can be obtained from the authors. 
33 The Stata command pstest was used. 
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although the differences between treatment and control group means were reduced 
considerably by matching in most cases. 
 
Table 2: Simple matching estimates across gender using kernel matching bandwidth 
0.05 for all four comparison groups 
Outcome variables  vs eligible  
 
 vs  
 
 
+  vs  
 vs  
Comparison 1 2 3 4 
 Kernel matching, 0.0534 
Variation of log per 
capita expenditure 
(Taka) 
-0.014** -0.014** -0.001 -0.034* 
Log per capita 
expenditure (Taka) -0.019 -0.011 0.019 -0.089** 
Log women non-
landed assets (Taka) 1.036*** 0.498*** 0.349** -0.022 
Female labour supply, 
aged 16-59, hours per 
month 
52.63*** 57.81*** 31.86*** 78.43*** 
Male labour supply, 
aged 16-59, hours per 
month 
-30.33** -47.06*** 40.00*** -276.22*** 
Girl school enrolment, 
aged 5-17 years 0.053* 0.060* 0.061** 0.077 
Boy school enrolment, 
aged 5-17 years 0.027 0.035 0.060** -0.011 
Source: Authors calculations. 
Notes: *statistically significant at 10%, **statistically significant at 5%, ***statistically significant at 1%. 
Using PnK data, see footnote 8. Stata routine psmatch235
 
 using the logit model outlined in Table 1 is 
used. Standard errors (not reported) are bootstrapped. 
The results in Table 2 are rather mixed, with different comparisons showing different 
levels of significance for different outcome variables. When comparing  versus all 
eligible and not eligible  (comparison 2), microcredit participation appears to 
significantly improve women’s non-landed assets, female labour supply and girls’ 
school enrolment, for example female microfinance participants appear to work 57 
hours more per month (presumed benefit) than non-participants. However, when 
                                                     
34 1-nearest neighbour matching as well as kernel matching with bandwidth 0.01 and 0.02 were 
applied in addition to 0.05 but the various algorithms and bandwidths results did not differ 
significantly and thus only the results using a bandwidth of 0.05 are shown here. 
35 Robustness checks were conducted using different Stata routines including psmatch2 (Leuven and 
Sianesi, 2003), and pscore (Becker and Ichino, 2002). The results obtained did not vary significantly.  
Duvendack, M. & Palmer-Jones, R.                         DEV Working Paper 27 
 
22 
 
directly comparing microfinance participants with participants in other non-
microfinance financing schemes (comparison 4), microfinance participants do worse 
than non-microfinance borrowers in terms of log of per capita expenditure and the 
variation thereof. Comparison 1,  versus eligible , suggests that microcredit 
participation has significant negative impacts on the variation of the log of per capita 
expenditure, but that it significantly improves women’s non-landed assets, female 
labour supply and girls’ school enrolment. However, most other outcome variables 
remain insignificant within this comparison. Comparison 3 indicates significant 
positive impacts on all outcome variables except the log of per capita expenditure 
and its variation which are insignificant, implying that microfinance in combination 
with other forms of finance makes a bigger difference to the lives of the poor.    
 
The results above recur for women’s borrowing (see Table 3). It seems that 
microfinance participation has an apparently significant positive impact on female 
related outcome variables such as women’s non-landed assets, female labour supply 
and partially on girls’ school enrolment (see comparisons 1, 2 and 3). However, there 
are little significant effects on the remaining variables. Noteworthy are the 
significantly negative impacts of microfinance participation on the log of per capita 
expenditure and the variation thereof as indicated by comparisons 1, 2 and 4 in Table 
2 and Table 3; this is in contrast to PnK’s headline findings.  
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Table 3: Matching estimates of impact by gender (kernel matching bandwidth 0.05 
for all four comparison groups) 
Outcome variables  vs 
eligible  
 
 vs  
 
 
+  vs 
 
 vs 
 
Comparison 1 2 3 4 
 Kernel matching, 0.0536 
Variation of log per 
capita expenditure 
(Taka) 
Women -0.017** -0.016* -0.009 -0.047 
Men -0.017** -0.030*** -0.001 -0.039* 
Log per capita 
expenditure (Taka) 
Women -0.019 -0.013 0.012 -0.126* 
Men -0.021 -0.046** 0.015 -0.079** 
Log women non-landed 
assets (Taka) 
Women 1.009*** 0.754*** 0.561*** -0.848 
Men 1.297*** -0.000 0.244 0.249 
Female labour supply, 
aged 16-59, hours per 
month 
Women 54.42*** 101.64*** 54.71*** 32.77 
Men -43.74*** -42.02*** 30.85*** 93.03*** 
Male labour supply, 
aged 16-59, hours per 
month 
Women -51.80*** -
257.41*** 
-49.52*** -83.27 
Men 18.42 401.30*** 49.83*** -
329.40*** 
Girl school enrolment, 
aged 5-17 years 
Women 0.040 0.067* 0.061** -0.216 
Men 0.097*** 0.032 0.060** 0.133 
Boy school enrolment, 
aged 5-17 years 
Women 0.029 0.045 0.050 -0.128 
Men 0.039 -0.001 0.054** -0.017 
Source: Authors calculations. 
Notes:  Notes: *statistically significant at 10%, **statistically significant at 5%, ***statistically 
significant at 1%. Using PnK data, see footnote 8. Stata routine psmatch237
 
 using the logit model 
outlined in Table 1 is used. Standard errors (not reported) are bootstrapped. 
                                                     
36 As in the case of the results presented in Table 2, 1-nearest neighbour matching as well as kernel 
matching with bandwidth 0.01 and 0.02 were applied in addition to 0.05 but the various algorithms 
and bandwidths results did not differ significantly and thus only the results using a bandwidth of 0.05 
are shown here. 
37 As before, robustness checks were conducted using different Stata routines. The results obtained did 
not vary significantly.  
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To conclude, the findings presented in Table 2 and Table 3 are mixed and it is not 
obvious that microcredit participation is associated with more significant impacts 
than participation in other non-microcredit sources of borrowing. Comparison 3 
which looks at  +  versus all eligible and not eligible  
suggests that microfinance in combination with other forms of finance makes a real 
difference, while microfinance alone compared to other sources of finance 
(  has mixed or even significantly negative impacts (comparison 4). 
 
The results in Table 2 provide evidence that participation in both microcredit and 
other sources of borrowing is associated with significant positive effects for some 
outcome variables. It appears that any form of finance – microcredit, formal or 
informal borrowing - can be associated with higher well-being of participating 
households.  
 
However, when examining the results by gender (see Table 3), we find that impacts 
for male labour supply is greater in the case of male borrowing (and female labour 
supply falls). Similarly the impact of female labour supply is greater for women in 
the case of female borrowing (and male labour supply falls).  
 
To summarise our arguments so far; relatively few households served as matches as 
illustrated by Figure 3 and further explored in Appendix 4. This raises the question 
of the suitability of PSM in the context of PnK. The PnK data set has very few 
households in control villages (n=260), many of which are not likely matches not least 
because of because large differences in landholdings makes them ‘not eligible’. There 
are relatively few non-borrowing eligible households in treatment villages, and 
anyway these are likely different in significant ways to microfinance borrowers by 
the very fact that they are not microfinance borrowers although they could have 
been. This is a limitation of the sampling strategy described above, and is a major 
drawback since PSM works best when there are more control than treatment 
households (Smith and Todd, 2005). Moreover, a rich and high quality data set is 
required to optimise results (Smith and Todd, 2005), which appears not to be the case 
here.  
 
Sensitivity analysis on treatment group comparisons 
 
Although significant effects are found using PSM it is questionable whether these are 
robust to unobservables because PSM cannot control for unobservable characteristics. 
Rosenbaum (2002) developed sensitivity analysis to explore the robustness of 
matching estimates to selection on unobservables (Rosenbaum, 2002). Ichino, Mealli 
and Nannicini (2006) argue that ‘sensitivity analysis should always accompany the 
presentation of matching estimates’ (19). 
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Rosenbaum (2002) invites us to imagine a number Γ (gamma)  1) which captures 
the degree of association, of an unobserved characteristic with the treatment and 
outcome, required for it (the unobserved characteristic) to explain the observed 
impact. Γ is the ratio of the odds38
 
 that the treated have this unobserved characteristic 
to the odds that the controls have it; a low odds ratio (near to one) indicates that it is 
not unlikely that such an unobserved variable exists. Cornfield et al (1959) use the 
example of the effect of smoking on lung cancer. In this case, which is now surely 
without doubt, data from the late 1950s gives a gamma > 5 for such an unobserved 
variable, which is, it is suggested, highly unlikely to have been unobserved because 
of its strong association between smoking and death. 
This approach can be implemented using the rbounds procedure in Stata (Becker 
and Caliendo, 2007); this procedure uses the matching estimates to calculate the 
confidence intervals (for a given level of confidence – for example 95%) of the 
outcome variable for different values of Γ.  A value of Γ that produces a confidence 
interval that encompasses zero is one that would make the estimated impact not 
statistically significant at the relevant level of confidence. If the lowest Γ (which 
encompasses zero) is relatively small (say < 2) then one may assert that the likelihood 
of such an unobserved characteristic is relatively high and therefore that the 
estimated impact is rather sensitive to the existence of unobservables (DiPrete and 
Gangl, 2004). Conversely, if the value of Γ that produces a confidence interval 
encompassing zero is large (say > 5) then it is rather unlikely that such a variable 
would not have been discovered, since its association with the outcome is so high. In 
this case one can say that the effect is rather robust to unobservables, and it appears 
unlikely that such a confounding variable would not have been observed. 
 
Sensitivity analysis can be illustra ted by calcula ting the Γ a t which the estima ted 
impact of microfinance participation on the log of women’s non-landed assets for 
comparison 2 is no longer statistically significant. Table 2 shows that the kernel 
matching impact estimate with a bandwidth of 0.05 for the log of women’s non-
landed assets is 0.498 which is statistically significant at 1%. However, this may not 
be due to membership per se but to unobserved characteristics that account for 
membership (and or its impact). Sensitivity analysis explores the vulnerability of this 
impact estimate to selection on unobservables.  
 
Table 4 reports the rbounds results, showing that when Γ = 1.2, a relatively small 
difference in the odds of exposure, or more, the 95% confidence interval of the point 
impact estimates encompasses zero; at gamma = 1.5 the Hodges-Lehmann point 
estimates encompass zero. This implies that a relatively small increase in the 
likelihood of being a participant due to an unobservable characteristic which also 
                                                     
38 Odds, which are widely used in assessing probabilistic outcomes, are derived from probabilities (0 ≤ 
 ≤ 1) by the following formula: . 
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increases the benefits from borrowing, is required to explain the observed impact. It 
is not unlikely that such an unobserved confounding variable exists. Consequently, 
we suggest, the observed impact of microfinance membership on the log of women’s 
non-landed assets may well be confounded by one or more unobserved variables 
associated with both MFI borrowing and this impact – for example, unobserved 
entrepreneurial abilities. 
 
Table 4: Sensitivity analysis for log of women’s non-landed assets for microfinance 
participants across R1-3 
 Significance levels Hodges-Lehmann point 
estimates 
95% Confidence 
intervals 
Gamma 
(Γ) 
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum 
1 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 0.886 0.886 0.315 1.317 
1.2 < 0.0001 < 0.0867 0.465 1.218 -0.245 1.570 
1.3 < 0.0001 < 0.2329 0.274 1.341 -0.532 1.694 
1.4 < 0.0001 < 0.4422 0.065 1.439 -0.710 1.796 
1.5 < 0.0001 < 0.6547 -0.159 1.533 -0.886 1.891 
Source: Authors calculations from data source given in footnote 8.   
 
Sensitivity analysis was carried out on all outcome variables for all four treatment 
group comparisons. The evidence provided by those tests does not contradict this 
conclusion, namely that all the impact estimates presented in Table 2 and Table 3 are 
highly sensitive to selection on unobservables3940
                                                     
39 The detailed results from those sensitivity tests are not presented here but the results and relevant 
Stata do-files can be made available upon request.   
. 
40 As a brief note, we re-analysed the PnK panel by a combination of PSM and differences-in-
differences. The PSM matches of R1-3 were retained and merged with R4. Our panel analysis confirms 
most of the cross-section findings described earlier and it can be concluded that neither cross-section 
nor panel data analysis support PnK’s and Khandker’s original claims, which provide an overly 
positive picture of the impact of microcredit. RnM’s replication of Khandker also casts doubts about 
Khandker’s findings (RnM: 39). 
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Conclusion 
 
The replication of PnK and associated studies poses a challenge due to the complex 
research design and poor documentation of the data. All studies that deal with the 
PnK data, that is Morduch, Chemin, RnM and this study, agree that PnK overstate 
the impacts of microcredit. PnK estimated positive and significant impacts for 
literally all of the six outcome variables with stronger impacts when women were 
involved in microcredit (PnK: 987-988). Morduch argued that PnK overestimated the 
impact of microcredit in part because the eligibility criterion was not strictly 
enforced, and he cannot support PnK’s claims that microcredit increases per capita 
expenditure, school enrolment for children (Morduch: 30) or labour supply. Pitt 
challenged Morduch’s conclusions with simulated data, and confirms the results of 
PnK’s undocumented and undocumentable estimation procedure. RnM confute Pitt’s 
claims with their (available) data and documented computer code.  
 
Using PSM, Chemin finds lower impact estimates than PnK for all outcome variables 
except male labour supply (Chemin: 478). Doubts about both Morduch and Chemin 
arise because of problems in replicating their data constructions, and in the latter 
case the failure to conduct sensitivity analysis. RnM’s findings of MFI impact are 
mixed and mostly insignificant.  
 
The studies by PnK, Morduch, Chemin and RnM do not address the role of multiple 
sources of borrowing41
 
 which has implications for the nature and constitution of the 
treatment and control groups. As a result, this study, using PSM with sensitivity 
analysis, made different comparisons to examine impacts using putatively more 
appropriate, and homogeneous, treatment and control groups. This strategy found 
generally positive but mixed results when comparing microcredit participation with 
non-participation, but there is no clear evidence that microcredit as such is more 
beneficial than other sources of finance; moreover, sensitivity analysis shows that all 
these estimates of impact are highly vulnerable to unobservables, in part, perhaps, 
because of the poor quality of the matches.  
Many microfinance adepts agree that individuals essentially need to borrow from 
multiple sources to obtain sufficient funds that would allow them to engage in more 
productive activities (see Fernando, 1997); microcredit loans are often too small to 
meet the needs of microentrepreneurs (Venkata and Yamini, 2010). In addition, 
multiple sources of borrowing are often required to smooth income and consumption 
patterns as well as to cope with emergencies (Venkata and Yamini, 2010). Fernando 
(1997), Coleman (1999) and Venkata and Yamini (2010) find that it is common for 
individuals to use borrowing from one source to pay off the loans of another, 
including microfinance, on time.  
                                                     
41 Khandker (2000) only explores the effects of other borrowing sources on a limited set of variables. 
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Criticisms of the more strident and unqualified claims about microfinance (using 
RCTs) are becoming more common (Banerjee et al, 2009; RnM; Karlan and Zinman, 
2009) and further investigations as to the impact of microcredit versus other financial 
tools should be encouraged, whether RCTs or carefully designed observational 
studies that collect a rich and high quality data set. It is arguable that carefully 
conducted observational studies using quasi-experimental designs can and perhaps 
should have come to the appropriate conclusions, and could have done so with even 
these data had the data manipulation and analysis been appropriate, without the 
need to engage in RCTs (for a critique on RCTs see Deaton, 2009; Imbens, 2009; 
Pritchett, 2009). 
 
The analysis in this paper has raised doubts about the capabilities of PSM, to rescue 
robust estimates of impact, at least with the sorts of data available. A critique of 
econometric techniques is not new; in a landmark paper Leamer (1983) criticises the 
key assumptions many econometric methods are built on and complains about ‘the 
whimsical character of econometric inference’ (38). Despite his pessimistic view on 
the usefulness of econometric methods, there has been a trend towards ever more 
sophisticated techniques which, however, do not necessarily provide convincing 
solutions to the challenges of impact evaluation. A similar conclusion would seem to 
apply to PSM. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: Weighted means and standard deviations, PnK and RnM  
Variables 
PnK 1998 RnM 20091 2 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Age of all individuals 23 18 23 18 
Schooling of individual aged 5 or above 
(years) 
1.377 2.773 2.066 3.136 
Parents of HH head own land? 0.256 0.564 0.254 0.563 
Brothers of HH head own land? 0.815 1.308 0.810 1.305 
Sisters of HH head own land? 0.755 1.208 0.750 1.206 
Parents of HH head’s spouse own land? 0.529 0.784 0.529 0.783 
Brothers of HH head’s spouse own land? 0.919 1.427 0.919 1.427 
Sisters of HH head’s spouse own land? 0.753 1.202 0.753 1.202 
Household land (decimals) 76.142 108.540 76.145 108.052 
Highest grade completed by HH head 2.486 3.501 2.523 3.525 
Sex of household head (male=1) 0.948 0.223 0.948 0.223 
Age of household head (years) 40.821 12.795 40.874 12.789 
Highest grade completed by any female HH 
member 
1.606 2.853 1.664 2.999 
Highest grade completed by any male HH 
member 
3.082 3.081 3.277 4.016 
Adult female not present in HH? 0.017 0.129 0.017 0.129 
Adult male not present in HH? 0.035 0.185 0.035 0.185 
Spouse not present in HH? 0.126 0.332 0.123 0.329 
Amount borrowed by female from BRAC 
(Taka) 
350 1,574 349 1,564 
Amount borrowed by male from BRAC 
(Taka) 
172 1,565 173 1,575 
Amount borrowed by female from BRDB 
(Taka) 
114 747 114 746 
Amount borrowed by male from BRDB 
(Taka) 
203 1,573 204 1,576 
Amount borrowed by female from GB (Taka) 956 4,293 972 4,324 
Amount borrowed by male from GB (Taka) 374 2.923 360 2,895 
Notes:  
1. Source: PnK, table A1, p. 993, based on R1. 
2. Source: RnM, table 1, p. 15, based on R1. 
Morduch and Pitt do not provide any descriptive statistics.  
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Appendix 2: Descriptive statistics of individuals belonging to any of the four 
treatment groups across treatment and control villages and across eligibility criteria42
Independent variables  
 
    
Sex HH head (male=1) 1.055 1.053 1.016 1.036 
0.228 0.224 0.126 0.187 
Age (years) 34.616 34.672 40.687 32.618 
10.551 10.529 12.752 15.244 
Age household head (years) 41.044 40.867 43.589 43.178 
11.944 11.881 13.334 12.407 
Number adult male in household 1.344 1.347 1.639 1.612 
0.794 0.796 1.073 1.085 
Marital status (yes=1) 0.873 0.873 0.938 0.337 
0.333 0.333 0.241 0.473 
Landholdings HH head parents 0.209a 0.222b 0.261c 0.248d 
0.533 0.549 0.565 0.561 
Landholdings HH head brothers 0.557a 0.567b 0.766c 0.720d 
1.071 1.083 1.414 1.223 
Highest education any HH member 3.619 3.649 5.350 4.455 
3.429 3.424 3.944 4.022 
Highest education female HH member 1.178 1.183 2.248 1.788 
2.341 2.346 3.378 3.118 
Savings 3543.534 3651.482 4418.86 4091.61 
5168.575 5533.265 20083.07 17911.66 
Livestock value 2603.311 2654.342 3935.737 3678.958 
3843.594 3908.822 5926.48 6014.571 
Own non-farm enterprise (yes=1) 0.555 0.556 0.442 0.467 
0.4972 0.497 0.497 0.499 
Household size 5.456 5.454 6.191 6.514 
2.063 2.081 2.633 2.735 
Outcome variables    
 Total HH expenditure per capita 
per week (Taka) 
76.872 77.805 97.231 81.035 
33.196 34.639 62.918 48.065 
Women non-landed assets (Taka) 2476.51 2434.943 2968.477 2741.315 
6736.685 6634.52 13068.11 9006.549 
Female labour supply, hours per month, 
aged 16-59 years 
101.409 98.449 13.350 18.481 
166.251 165.597 62.106 74.266 
Male labour supply, hours per month, 
aged 16-59 years 
225.607 237.157 456.793 121.542 
332.272 334.151 303.905 257.661 
Girl school enrolment, aged 5-17 years 
(yes=1) 
0.638e 0.644f 0.681g 0.616h 
0.481 0.479 0.467 0.487 
Boy school enrolment, aged 5-17 years 
(yes=1) 
0.652i 0.656j 0.758k 0.665l 
0.477 0.475 0.429 0.472 
Number of observations 875 922 371 8387 
   
 
                                                     
42 The interested reader can compare our descriptive statistics with those in RnM who also provide 
comparisons with PnK. 
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Source: Authors calculations. 
Notes: Standard deviation in italics. Using PnK data, see footnote 8. MF=Participant in microfinance 
only; Multiple=Participant in microfinance and other non-microfinance (formal/informal) borrowing; 
Borr=Participant in other non-microfinance (formal/informal) borrowing; None=No borrowing at all. 
• a: n = 861; b: n = 908; c: n = 368; d: n = 8278 
• e: n = 516; f: n = 542; g: n = 232; h: n = 5621 
• i: n = 554; j: n = 582; k: n = 248; l: n = 5769 
The mean values in Appendix 2 differ from the mean values presented by PnK and RnM as illustrated 
in Appendix 1. ANOVA has been applied examining all possible pairwise comparisons to assess 
whether the differences in the mean values between the various comparison groups are statistically 
significant. The ANOVA results show that for most variables differences are not significant at 
conventional levels of significance, with few exceptions. Mean values of   versus  
significantly differ for age of household head, landholdings of household head’s parents, total 
household expenditure per capita per week, log of female non-landed assets, female and male labour 
supply. 
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Appendix 3: Number of individuals by treatment option by treatment and control 
villages across eligibility criteria 
 Treatment villages Control 
villages 
 
 BRDB BRAC GB Control Total 
Microfinance only 298 279 298 0 875 
Microfinance & informal borrowing 
only 
15 8 7 0 30 
Microfinance & formal borrowing only 9 1 1 0 11 
Microfinance & both formal & informal 
borrowing 
6 0 0 0 6 
Non-microfinance borrowing - 
informal borrowing only 
73 54 36 91 254 
Non-microfinance borrowing - formal 
borrowing only 
30 26 22 18 96 
Non-microfinance borrowing - both 
formal & informal borrowing 
6 3 5 6 20 
No borrowing 2,287 2,329 2,327 1,444 8,387 
Total 2,724 2,700 2,696 1,559 9,679 
Source: Authors calculations. 
Notes: Figures correspond to those presented in Figure 2 but a more detailed breakdown is provided 
within sub-groups and by village type. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Duvendack, M. & Palmer-Jones, R.                         DEV Working Paper 27 
 
38 
 
Appendix 4: Simple matching estimates across gender using nearest neighbour 
matching for all four comparison groups with number of matches and pseudo R-
squared 
Outcome variables 
 
 vs 
eligible  
 
 vs  
 
 + 
 vs  
 vs 
 
Comparison 1 2 3 4 
1-nearest neighbour matching 
Variation of log per capita 
expenditure (Taka) 
-0.017* -0.004 0.000 -0.019 
Log per capita expenditure (Taka) -0.012 0.003 0.035** -0.081 
Log women non-landed assets 
(Taka) 
1.230*** 0.589** 0.115 0.333 
Female labour supply, aged 16-59, 
hours per month 
61.70*** 51.92*** 36.92*** 71.62*** 
Male labour supply, aged 16-59, 
hours per month 
-47.45*** -27.46 32.68** 
-
259.98**
* 
Girl school enrolment, aged 5-17 
years -0.012 0.073* 0.034 0.043 
Boy school enrolment, aged 5-17 
years 
0.006 0.082* 0.053 -0.012 
No of treated observations used 861 861 1,275 861 
No of untreated observations used  655 674 918 191 
Total number of observations 4,123 5,068 5,436 1,229 
Pseudo R-squared 0.077 0.130 0.104 0.263 
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5-nearest neighbour matching 
Variation of log per capita 
expenditure (Taka) 
-0.016** -0.004 -0.000 -0.045* 
Log per capita expenditure (Taka) -0.014 -0.006 0.024* -0.072* 
Log women non-landed assets 
(Taka) 
1.100*** 0.475** 0.389** 0.231 
Female labour supply, aged 16-59, 
hours per month 54.28*** 57.75*** 33.33*** 69.17*** 
Male labour supply, aged 16-59, 
hours per month 
-27.87* -43.64*** 32.12*** 
-
254.63**
* 
Girl school enrolment, aged 5-17 
years 
0.061* 0.073* 0.048* 0.073 
Boy school enrolment, aged 5-17 
years 0.040 0.082* 0.068** -0.022 
No of treated observations used 861 861 1,275 861 
No of untreated observations 
used43 655   674 918 191 
Total number of observations 4,123 5,068 5,436 1,229 
Pseudo R-squared 0.077 0.130 0.104 0.263 
Source: Authors calculations. 
Notes: *statistically significant at 10%, **statistically significant at 5%, ***statistically significant at 1%. 
Using PnK data, see footnote 8. Stata routine psmatch2 is applied. The logit model outlined in Table 1 
is used. The results in this table refer to the differences in the mean values between matched samples. 
t-tests before and after matching were employed for all results presented in this table to investigate the 
differences in the mean values for each covariate X across matched samples; as before, the test 
provided conclusive results. Standard errors (not reported) are bootstrapped. 
 
                                                     
43 The identical number of cases of matched untreated for 1- and 5- nearest neighbour matching is 
further evidence of the lack of plentiful comparison cases. 
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Appendix 5: Eligibility Criterion 
Referring to Figure 1, Morduch points out that PnK label any participating 
households in the programme villages (group D) as eligible, even households that 
should have been excluded according to the less than 0.5 acres eligibility criterion. As 
a result, according to Morduch, mistargeting occurred, as Group D contains 
participants who own more than 0.5 acres of land. Ravallion (2008, p. 3818) and 
Chemin (p. 465) support Morduch’s view that PnK do not strictly enforce the 
eligibility criterion. 
 
Pitt rationalises this claiming that the value of land of treated households which 
cultivate/possess more than 0.5 acres is so low that the value of the land of these 
households is effectively less than the median value of 0.5 acres of average land. If 
Pitt’s claim is indeed true and the three microfinance programmes do take land 
quality into account when establishing programme eligibility, then the mistargeted 
households that participate should have total land values of no more than the 
median unit value of land of the correctly identified households that participate (that 
is less than 0.5 acres). The data are depicted in the following Figure.  
 
Figure 4: Land unit values by total land value and targeting 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on PnK data R1 downloaded from the World Bank website. 
 
The median unit value of land of eligible participating households (having less than 
0.5 acres of land) equals 1000 Taka per decimal (50 decimals equal 0.5 acres). Thus, 
one might suggest the cut-off point for establishing programme eligibility is 50,000 
Taka, that is mistargeted households that participate should have a total value of 
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land less than 50,000 Taka. However, 50% of the mistargeted households that 
participate have total land values of greater or equal to 85,000 Taka, and 72% of those 
mistargeted households have total land values of greater or equal to 50,000 Taka (a 
reasonable cut-off for using a value of land criterion). Hence, Pitt’s argument does 
not convince. Further information and a scatter plot showing the details can be 
obtained from the authors. PnK support the use of landownership as an eligibility 
criterion and argue that the virtual absence of an active land market justifies its 
application (PnK: 970). Morduch provides evidence to the contrary; he argues that 
there is substantial evidence on an active land market in South Asia (Morduch: 4). He 
argues that close to one eighth of participants in fact bought substantial amounts of 
land a few years before the survey was conducted.  
 
Chemin and Morduch argue that simply comparing groups E to F or groups E to B 
(see Figure 1) is misleading due to selection bias. As a result, Morduch proposes 
comparing the outcomes of groups E + F to those in group B which would provide 
bias-free impact estimates. However, this comparison assumes that landholdings are 
exogenous, that is that membership in groups E, F or B is not influenced by self-
selection (Morduch: 7). Furthermore, the comparison Morduch proposes does not 
‘…reflect general differences across villages’ (Morduch: 8). Therefore, assuming that 
there are minor spill-over effects from group E to C or A, he suggests employing a 
simple differences-in-differences (DID) estimation that compares the outcomes of 
groups E + F to C. Similarly, he recommends conducting a comparison for group A 
relative to group B (Morduch: 8). After employing these comparisons, Morduch finds 
no statistically significant impacts of exposure to microfinance. Pitt, and Khandker, 
2000, address the potential contamination problem, and, find that it appears to make 
no substantive difference to the results, and this is supported by our results. To avoid 
confusion, we report whether we use a de jure or de facto classification. 
 
